Below are some of my job titles and accomplishments. KSAT ID. Essentially, Design Interactive discovered their team lacked both the expertise and confidence to effectively enhance their cybersecurity. Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 104. Cyber threats to these systems could distort or undermine their intended uses, creating risks that these capabilities may not be reliably employable at critical junctures. It is common to find RTUs with the default passwords still enabled in the field. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of . A potential impediment to implementing this recommendation is the fact that many cyber threats will traverse the boundaries of combatant commands, including U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the geographic combatant commands. Cyber vulnerabilities in the private sector pose a serious threat to national security, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said., L. No. . However, the credibility conundrum manifests itself differently today. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21) is the most significant attempt ever undertaken by Congress to improve national cybersecurity and protect U.S. critical infrastructure from nation-state, non-state, and criminal behavior. Mark Montgomery is Executive Director of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and SeniorDirector of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Supply Chain Risk Management: Reducing Threats to Key U.S. Supply Chains, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2020), available at <, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/20200925-NCSC-Supply-Chain-Risk-Management-tri-fold.pdf, For a strategy addressing supply chain security at the national level, beyond DOD and defense institution building. 1 Build a more lethal. Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber Planning,, See, for example, Emily O. Goldman and Michael Warner, Why a Digital Pearl Harbor Makes Sense . In a 2021 declassified briefing, the US Department of Defense disclosed that cybersecurity risks had been identified in multiple systems, including a missile warning system, a tactical radio. The DoD has further directed that cyber security technology must be integrated into systems because it is too expensive and impractical to secure a system after it has been designed The design of security for an embedded system is challenging because security requirements are rarely accurately identified at the start of the design process. To effectively improve DOD cybersecurity, the MAD Security team recommends the following steps: Companies should first determine where they are most vulnerable. 2 (January 1979), 289324; Thomas C. Schelling. 11 Robert J. National Defense University . Cyber vulnerabilities in the private sector pose a serious threat to national security, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. Upholding cyberspace behavioral norms during peacetime. This articles discussion of credibility focuses on how cyber operations could undermine the credibility of conventional and nuclear deterrence, rather than the challenge of how to establish credible deterrence using cyber capabilities. Building dependable partnerships with private-sector entities who are vital to helping support military operations. Perhaps most distressingly, the GAO has been warning about these cyber vulnerabilities since the mid-1990s. Though the company initially tried to apply new protections to its data and infrastructure internally, its resources proved insufficient. 52 Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, DC: DOD, August 2018). 115232August 13, 2018, 132 Stat. , ed. See James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,, 41, no. By Continuing to use this site, you are consenting to the use of cookies. The literature on nuclear deterrence theory is extensive. Around 68% of companies have been said to experience at least one endpoint attack that compromised their data or infrastructure. 42 Lubold and Volz, Navy, Industry Partners Are Under Cyber Siege.. The scans usually cover web servers as well as networks. Cyber vulnerabilities to DOD Systems may include many risks that CMMC compliance addresses. Rather, most modern weapons systems comprise a complex set of systemssystems of systems that entail operat[ing] multiple platforms and systems in a collaborate manner to perform military missions.48 An example is the Aegis weapon system, which contains a variety of integrated subsystems, including detection, command and control, targeting, and kinetic capabilities.49 Therefore, vulnerability assessments that focus on individual platforms are unable to identify potential vulnerabilities that may arise when these capabilities interact or work together as part of a broader, networked platform. These applications can result in real-time operational control adjustments, reports, alarms and events, calculated data source for the master database server archival, or support of real-time analysis work being performed from the engineering workstation or other interface computers. "These weapons are essential to maintaining our nation . An effective attack is to export the screen of the operator's HMI console back to the attacker (see Figure 14). Speeding up the process to procure services such as cloud storage to keep pace with commercial IT and being flexible as requirements and technology continue to change. . 48 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Chief Systems Engineer, Naval Systems of Systems Systems Engineering Guidebook, Volume II, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Navy, November 6, 2006), 3. For example, as a complement to institutionalizing a continuous process for DOD to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of weapons systems, the department could formalize a capacity for continuously seeking out and remediating cyber threats across the entire enterprise. large versionFigure 15: Changing the database. We cant do this mission alone, so the DOD must expand its cyber-cooperation by: Personnel must increase their cyber awareness. 2 (February 2016). 10 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), 26. For example, Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay explore how offensive cyber operations that target a states nuclear command, control, and communications could undermine strategic deterrence and increase the risk of war.32 Similarly, Austin Long notes potential pathways from offensive cyber operations to inadvertent escalation (which is by definition a failure of deterrence) if attacks on even nonmilitary critical systems (for example, power supplies) could impact military capabilities or stoke fears that military networks had likewise been compromised.33. Large DCS often need to use portions of the business network as a route between multiple control system LANs (see Figure 5). Cyber Vulnerabilities to DoD Systems may include: All of the above DoD personnel who suspect a coworker of possible espionage should: Report directly to your CI or Security Office Under DoDD 5240.06 Reportable Foreign Intelligence Contacts, Activities, Indicators and Behaviors; which of the following is not reportable? 4 (Spring 1980), 6. The Pentagon's concerns are not limited to DoD systems. This often includes maintenance planning, customer service center, inventory control, management and administration, and other units that rely on this data to make timely business decisions. Given the extraordinarily high consequence of a successful adversary cyber-enabled information operation against nuclear command and control decisionmaking processes, DOD should consider developing a comprehensive training and educational requirement for relevant personnel to identify and report potential activity. large versionFigure 4: Control System as DMZ. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, see, for example, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Implementing Cybersecurity in DOD Supply Chains White Paper: Manufacturing Division Survey Results, (Arlington, VA: NDIA, July 2018), available at <, http://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/ndia/divisions/manufacturing/documents/cybersecurity-in-dod-supply-chains.ashx?la=en, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and, Sustainment, Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, available at <, >; DOD, Press Briefing by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Kevin Fahey, and Chief Information Security Officer for Acquisition Katie Arrington, January 31, 2020, available at <, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2072073/press-briefing-by-under-secretary-of-defense-for-acquisition-sustainment-ellen/, Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting with Entities Using Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment,, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/14/2020-15293/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-with-entities-using-certain. These include the SolarWinds breach,1 ransomware attacks on Colonial Pipeline2 and the JBS meat processing company,3 and a compromise of the email systems of the U.S. Agency for International Development.4 U.S. officials have indicated their belief that Russia either sponsored . 1636, available at . Furthermore, with networks becoming more cumbersome, there is a dire need to actively manage cyber security vulnerabilities. , Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. DOD must additionally consider incorporating these considerations into preexisting table-top exercises and scenarios around nuclear force employment while incorporating lessons learned into future training.67 Implementing these recommendations would enhance existing DOD efforts and have a decisive impact on enhancing the security and resilience of the entire DOD enterprise and the critical weapons systems and functions that buttress U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities. Inevitably, there is an inherent tension between Congresss efforts to act in an oversight capacity and create additional requirements for DOD, and the latters desire for greater autonomy. 4 As defined in Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 8, 2018), The term blue cyberspace denotes areas in cyberspace protected by [the United States], its mission partners, and other areas DOD may be ordered to protect, while red cyberspace refers to those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy. Finally, all cyberspace that does not meet the description of either blue or red is referred to as gray cyberspace (I-4, I-5). Ransomware. CISA cites misconfigurations and poor security controls as a common reason why hackers can get initial access to sensitive data or company systems due to critical infrastructure. >; Zak Doffman, Cyber Warfare: U.S. Military Admits Immediate Danger Is Keeping Us Up at Night, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/21/cyber-warfare-u-s-military-admits-immediate-danger-is-keeping-us-up-at-night/#7f48cd941061, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Deterrence and the Cold War,, Robert J. An attacker could also chain several exploits together . It is an open-source tool that cybersecurity experts use to scan web vulnerabilities and manage them. See the Cyberspace Solarium Commissions recent report, available at . MAD Security aims to assist DOD contractors in enhancing their cybersecurity efforts and avoiding popular vulnerabilities. Tomas Minarik, Raik Jakschis, and Lauri Lindstrom (Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2018), available at ; Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 28 Brantly, The Cyber Deterrence Problem; Borghard and Lonergan, The Logic of Coercion.. The Public Inspection page may also include documents scheduled for later issues, at the request of the issuing agency. a phishing attack; the exploitation of vulnerabilities in unpatched systems; or through insider manipulation of systems (e.g. The control system network is often connected to the business office network to provide real-time transfer of data from the control network to various elements of the corporate office. (2015), 5367; Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion, 4952. (Sood A.K. and international terrorist True DoD personnel who suspect a coworker of possible espionage should report directly to your CI OR security Office Wireless access points that allow unauthorized connection to system components and networks present vulnerabilities. However, selected components in the department do not know the extent to which users of its systems have completed this required training. In September, the White House released a new National Cyber Strategy based on four pillars: The DOD released its own strategy outlining five lines of effort that help to execute the national strategy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Richard K. Betts. The target must believe that the deterring state has both the capabilities to inflict the threatening costs and the resolve to carry out a threat.14 A deterring state must therefore develop mechanisms for signaling credibility to the target.15 Much of the Cold War deterrence literature focused on the question of how to convey resolve, primarily because the threat to use nuclear weaponsparticularly in support of extended deterrence guarantees to allieslacks inherent credibility given the extraordinarily high consequences of nuclear weapons employment in comparison to any political objective.16 This raises questions about decisionmakers willingness to follow through on a nuclear threat. Leading Edge: Combat Systems Engineering & Integration, (Dahlgren, VA: NAVSEA Warfare Centers, February 2013), 9; Aegis, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2166739/aegis-weapon-system/. The HMI provides graphical displays for presentation of status of devices, alarms and events, system health, and other information relevant to the system. Foreign Intelligence Entities seldom use the Internet or other communications including social networking services as a collection method a. A telematics system is tightly integrated with other systems in a vehicle and provides a number of functions for the user. In a typical large-scale production system utilizing SCADA or Distributed Control System (DCS) configuration there are many computer, controller and network communications components integrated to provide the operational needs of the system. Through the mutual cooperation between industry and the military in securing information, the DoD optimizes security investments, secures critical information, and provides an . 56 Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting with Entities Using Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, Federal Register, July 14, 2020, available at . Scholars and practitioners in the area of cyber strategy and conflict focus on two key strategic imperatives for the United States: first, to maintain and strengthen the current deterrence of cyberattacks of significant consequence; and second, to reverse the tide of malicious behavior that may not rise to a level of armed attack but nevertheless has cumulative strategic implications as part of adversary campaigns. 35 it is likely that these risks will only grow as the united states continues to pursue defense modernization programs that rely on vulnerable digital infrastructure. Much of the focus within academic and practitioner communities in the area of cyber deterrence has been on within-domain deterrence, and even studies of cross-domain deterrence have been largely concerned with the employment of noncyber instruments of power to deter cyberattacks. 1 (February 1997), 6890; Robert Jervis, Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images, in. 2 (January 1979), 289324; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace, Security Studies 26, no. 3 (2017), 454455. 50 Koch and Golling, Weapons Systems and Cyber Security, 191. A backup control center is used in more critical applications to provide a secondary control system if there is a catastrophic loss of the main system. 6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2020). 66 HASC, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 57 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Supply Chain Risk Management: Reducing Threats to Key U.S. Supply Chains (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2020), available at . The attacker must know how to speak the RTU protocol to control the RTU. Additionally, an attacker will dial every extension in the company looking for modems hung off the corporate phone system. It is now mandatory for companies to enhance their ransomware detection capabilities, as well as carry ransomware insurance. Work remains to be done. The Cyberspace Solarium Commissions March 2020 report details a number of policy recommendations to address this challenge.59 We now unpack a number of specific measures put forth by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission that Congress, acting in its oversight role, along with the executive branch could take to address some of the most pressing concerns regarding the cyber vulnerabilities of conventional and nuclear weapons systems. See also Alexander L. George, William E. Simons, and David I. The use of software has expanded into all aspects of . 47 Ibid., 25. None of the above 35 Relatedly, adversary campaigns to conduct cyber-enabled intellectual property theft against the U.S. military and the defense industrial base are also a concern because they continue to cause staggering losses of national security information and intellectual property. The strategic consequences of the weakening of U.S. warfighting capabilities that support conventionaland, even more so, nucleardeterrence are acute. Instead, malicious actors could conduct cyber-enabled information operations with the aim of manipulating or distorting the perceived integrity of command and control. Our working definition of deterrence is therefore consistent with how Nye approaches the concept. Koch and Golling, Weapons Systems and Cyber Security, 191. Additionally, the current requirement is to assess the vulnerabilities of individual weapons platforms. Networks can be used as a pathway from one accessed weapon to attack other systems. Several threats are identified. Unfortunately, in many cases when contractors try to enhance their security, they face a lot of obstacles that prevent them from effectively keeping their data and infrastructure protected. Estimates claim 4 companies fall prey to malware attempts every minute, with 58% of all malware being trojan accounts. 115232August 13, 2018, 132 Stat. Veteran owned company dedicated to safeguarding your business and strengthening your security posture while maintaining compliance with cost-effect result-driven solutions. Special vulnerabilities of AI systems. Relatedly, adversary campaigns to conduct cyber-enabled intellectual property theft against the U.S. military and the defense industrial base are also a concern because they continue to cause staggering losses of national security information and intellectual property. Using this simple methodology, a high-level calculation of cyber risk in an IT infrastructure can be developed: Cyber risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Information Value. In addition to assessing fielded systems vulnerabilities, DOD should enforce cybersecurity requirements for systems that are in development early in the acquisition life cycle, ensuring they remain an essential part of the front end of this process and are not bolted on later.64 Doing so would essentially create a requirement for DOD to institutionalize a continuous assessment process of weapons systems cyber vulnerabilities and annually report on these vulnerabilities, thereby sustaining its momentum in implementing key initiatives. The Government Accountability Office warned in a report issued today that the Defense Department "faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapons systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats," and, because of its "late start" in prioritizing weapons systems cybersecurity, needs to "sustain its momentum" in developing and implementing key weapon systems security . 1 (2017), 20. For instance, the typical feared scenario is the equivalent of a cyber Pearl Harbor or a cyber 9/11 eventa large-scale cyberattack against critical U.S. infrastructure that causes significant harm to life or property.34 This line of thinking, however, risks missing the ostensibly more significant threat posed by stealthy cyberspace activities that could undermine the stability of conventional or nuclear deterrence. Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002), 293312. Designs, develops, tests, and evaluates information system security throughout the systems development lifecycle. Specifically, in Section 1647 of the FY16 NDAA, which was subsequently updated in Section 1633 of the FY20 NDAA, Congress directed DOD to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of each major weapons system.60 Although this process has commenced, gaps remain that must be remediated. The business LAN is protected from the Internet by a firewall and the control system LAN is protected from the business LAN by a separate firewall. 65 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2018), available at ; Jon Lindsay, Digital Strangelove: The Cyber Dangers of Nuclear Weapons, Lawfare, March 12, 2020, available at ; Paul Bracken, The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Stability, Orbis 60, no. Borghard and Lonergan, The Logic of Coercion; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion. As Jacquelyn Schneider notes, this type of deterrence involves the use of punishment or denial across domains of warfighting and foreign policy to deter adversaries from utilizing cyber operations to create physical or virtual effects.31 The literature has also examined the inverse aspect of cross-domain deterrencenamely, how threats in the cyber domain can generate instability and risk for deterrence across other domains. , Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Navy, November 6, 2006), 3. 41 Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities, GAO-19-128 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2018), available at . Setting and enforcing standards for cybersecurity, resilience and reporting. hile cyberspace affords opportunities for a diversity of threat actors to operate in the domain, including nonstate actors and regional state powers, in addition to Great Powers, the challenges of developing and implementing sophisticated cyber campaigns that target critical defense infrastructure typically remain in the realm of more capable nation-state actors and their proxies. 5 For a notable exception, see Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, eds., Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 1 Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], 2018), available at ; Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Cyber Command, 2018), available at ; An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, Joint Force Quarterly 92 (1st Quarter 2019), 67. Optimizing the mix of service members, civilians and contractors who can best support the mission. Course Library: Common Cyber Threat Indicators and Countermeasures Page 8 Removable Media The Threat Removable media is any type of storage device that can be added to and removed from a computer while the system is running.Adversaries may use removable media to gain access to your system. How Do I Choose A Cybersecurity Service Provider? Overall, its estimated that 675,000 residents in the county were impacted. Cybersecurity Personnel who secure, defend, and preserve data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems by ensuring appropriate security controls and measures are in place, and taking internal defense actions. Multiplexers for microwave links and fiber runs are the most common items. The added strength of a data DMZ is dependent on the specifics of how it is implemented. 41, no. 30 Dorothy E. Denning, Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence, Joint Force Quarterly 77 (2nd Quarter 2015). And, if deterrence fails, cyber operations to disrupt or degrade the functioning of kinetic weapons systems could compromise mission assurance during crises and conflicts. Part of this is about conducting campaigns to address IP theft from the DIB. This provides an added layer of protection because no communications take place directly from the control system LAN to the business LAN. Encuentro Cuerpo Consular de Latinoamerica - Mesa de Concertacin MHLA More commercial technology will be integrated into current systems for maximum effectiveness in the ever-changing cybersphere. Abstract For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. However, adversaries could compromise the integrity of command and control systemsmost concerningly for nuclear weaponswithout exploiting technical vulnerabilities in the digital infrastructure on which these systems rely. The FY21 NDAA makes important progress on this front. Recognizing the interdependence among cyber, conventional, and nuclear domains, U.S. policymakers must prioritize efforts to reduce the cyber vulnerabilities of conventional and nuclear capabilities and ensure they are resilient to adversary action in cyberspace. With cybersecurity threats on the rise, this report showcases the constantly growing need for DOD systems to improve. Control systems are vulnerable to cyber attack from inside and outside the control system network. Art, To What Ends Military Power? International Security 4, no. For example, there is no permanent process to periodically assess the cybersecurity of fielded systems. Heartbleed came from community-sourced code. Telematics should therefore be considered a high-risk domain for systemic vulnerabilities. A system could be exploited through a single vulnerability, for example, a single SQL Injection attack could give an attacker full control over sensitive data. A surgical attacker needs a list of the point reference numbers in use and the information required to assign meaning to each of those numbers. , ed. 29 Borghard and Lonergan, The Logic of Coercion; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, 4.
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